Introduction 27
Researchers and professionals have increasingly addressed their interest on information and 28 communication technologies (ICT) for smart cities (Neirotti et Toppeta, 2010) . This is usually 38 labelled as the "Smart Communities" (SCC) innovation process. SCC has the purpose of focusing 39 on the development of a smart city that would include investments beyond pure ICT and that would 40 especially put emphasis on the role of the human capital and people's participation in the processes 41 of administration and service delivery's innovation (Caragliu et al., 2011; Toppeta, 2010) . 42
However, while great attention has been paid to SCC of citizens that co-create and co-participate to 43 the smartening of their cities, little work has explored how innovation could spring out from the 44 ideas of the insiders and the contributions of the city workers. What is a great potential in theory, is 45 mined by the complexity of the contest in practice. Indeed, local governments are usually resistant 46 to innovation processes and public employees are discouraged by bureaucratic procedures. Thus, 47 the phenomenon of bottom-up innovation in public administrations remains understudied and the 48 innovation process itself is usually considered as a black-box, which needs to be opened and studied 49 in order to understand the main enablers and inhibiters of its implementation (Brorstrom, 2015; 50 Piening, 2011; Fagerberg, 2005) . Therefore, the question of whether it is possible to build in 51 7 resistant, tricked with bureaucracy and risk averse, while innovation is risky and requires flexibility 126 (Brorstrom, 2015; Morgan, 2006; Du Gay, 2000) . 127
In the selection phase, people rationalize the number of plausible interpretations (Weick et 
Methodology 160
The research is based on a single case-study analysis (Yin, 1984) . This approach was chosen to 161 collect rich and longitudinal data following the process of development of a smart community in the 162
Municipality of Turin. Rich data was necessary to identify the fundamental steps of the process and 163 the main managerial and technological issues to be considered when planning such an initiative. 164
The case Innova.TO was selected because it can be considered as a pioneering example of SCC 165 building process internationally. 166
Case setting: Turin as a Smart City and the Innova.TO project 167
For decades fed by the automobile industry (Crivello, 2015), Turin's economy entered a period of 168 decline at the end of the last century due to the delocalisation of the car manufacturing facilities. In 169 order to limit the social and economic consequences, such as the increase of the public debt and the 170 unemployment rate, over the last decades the city's administration implemented a strategic plan to 171 convert Turin into a technological and cultural city (Crivello, 2015; Vanolo, 2015) . However, the 172 financial crisis of 2008 hit again the Turin's economy (Vanolo, 2015) . 
Results 237
The results are presented in the following according to the specified phases of sensemaking: 238 enactment, selection and retention (Weick et al., 2005; Weick, 1979) . 239
Enactment 240
The promoters had the idea of Innova.TO in 2013 when, during their attendance to an executive 241 master about innovation and technology, they asked themselves how to bring people back at the 242 centre of the innovation journey. The answer was "working on smart communities", as one of them 243
illustrates, "stimulating the sense of belonging and participation and transforming the employees in 244 the protagonists of innovation in their administrations". According to them, the local government 245 was doing a lot to support the city's innovation, through policy making, partnerships and smart 246 procurement processes, while doing nothing to innovate the city in its internal administrative 247 routines. As public employees, they felt they were usually evaluated for their performances, 248 12 conformation to their directors' expectations and for their doing exactly what they were asked to do. 249
On the contrary, they could be more than simple instruments of the public management, they could 250 be a vector of change, a community of innovators. "Turin Municipality: 10.500 public employees -251 10.500 potential innovators" became the slogan to promote Innova.TO, with the aim to enhance all 252 competences and intelligences of the Turin public administration. Even if the promoters' directors 253 seemed to appreciate the project, one year later Innova.TO was still an unexplored idea. The 254 promoters realized they had to find the endorsement of both the executives and political boards in 255 order to strengthen the idea and put it forward. Specifically, a visionary council member remained 256 particularly impressed and decided to commit with Innova.TO: "To be a smart city means also 257 reforming the management and organizational processes of the public administration, embracing the 258 intuitions of our employees, their know-how and competences". Also the Major seemed 259 enthusiastic: "This is a new integrated vision of our administration, which promotes the knowledge 260 sharing and collaborative organization". Contemporary, the promoters started to illustrate their idea 261 during public sector meetings and exhibitions, in order to raise their proof of concept. The idea was 262 transformed into a project in the Municipal Act number 2013-04814/068, approved by the 263 municipal council the 15 of October 2014, but no budget was allocated for the implementation. 264
Selection 265
As soon as after the act was billed, a technical committee, which included the two promoters, 266 started to organize the competition. Transparency and credibility were the two main concerns 267 because a common thinking during that period was that "Innova.TO is simply a marketing 268 calculation of the politicians that have embodied the idea". The technical committee found some 269 expedients to signal the reliability of the competition: first, the evaluation panel was composed of 270 experts internal and external to the Municipality; secondly, it was given the possibility to send the 271 applications anonymously, separated from the name of the applicants; third, executives were 272 excluded from the competition, to stimulate bottom-up innovation and do not make employees and 273 13 middle managers feel discouraged; fourth, it dedicated an online platform to the project, to let 274 employees interact, share ideas, submit their applications and let the smart community coalesce; 275 finally, it established public-private partnerships with private sponsors. The private sponsorships 276 were of help for several reasons. Indeed, Innova.TO was a zero-budget project and private sponsors 277 offered amazing prizes to award the winners, such as electric bicycles, smartphones, online 278 newspaper subscriptions, carsharing and bikesharing season tickets, for a total value of 12.000 279 euros. The prizes served also as an incentive to encourage employees' participation. Moreover, the 280 involvement of private partners increased the external and internal recognition of the project and its 281 consensus. The call for ideas was launched early in April 2014 and remained opened for 45 days, 282 during which employees interacted on the online platform and submitted their applications. The 283 vast majority of employees decided not to apply because still sceptical, as shown by some common 284 comments: "Bureaucracy will never let our ideas exist in practice", "What do they want by me? I 285 have worked here for years and nobody asked me anything". The jury classified the received 286 applications into seven categories, namely: improvement of transparency and accessibility to 287 services (19), organizational development (16), operative efficiency (14), the delivery of new 288 services (7), environment and energy efficiency (7), employees wellbeing (5), paperless and ICT 289 solutions (3). The best 20 applications were awarded during a public ceremony chaired by the 290
Major who declared that only the first 10 of them would have been implemented. 291
Retemption 292
One year after the award ceremony, no applications had entered the development phase. However, 293 during the months following the ceremony, Innova.TO was presented as a success initiative to 294 newspapers and even The Guardian titled "Devolution, the Italian-style -the cities forging their 295 own futures" (The Guardian, 30 July 2014). Innova.TO was introduced as a triumph during pubic 296 presentations, European meetings, public administration forums and the winners were invited to tell 297 their experience. While the promoters, politics and executives were saying "Yes, we did!", 298 14 employees common though was "A year is passed and nothing has changed". Some interviewed 299 individuals said that the completely exclusion of executives from competition made them hostile 300 instead of favouring a collective change. Moreover, no feedbacks were given about the progress of 301 the winner ideas, nor employees, one year later, knew if their ideas would have never been realized. 302
The vast majority of the few participants did not shared their ideas on the platform and applied 303 alone to the competition, as well emerged from one interviewee: "My project was a secret, I 304 couldn't share it with anybody else, neither with the end-users of my idea. I gave it for granted that 305 they would have accepted my innovation, because it really improves the flow of their work". While 306 externally strong, internal communication was weak as well as interactions among employees and 307 departments. After the ceremony, the winners were not kept in touch, as an interviewee said: "I 308 candidate myself to give a help during the implementation of our ideas, but they didn't give me the 309 opportunity". Another employee said: "When we stopped boosting the realization of our ideas, the 310 technical committee stopped to move forward". Conversely the two proponents affirmed: "The 311 winners should prompt the development of their projects, but are too shy and prefer to give up and 312 don't ask us to move forward". However, everybody agreed that Innova.TO was a signal that 313 something was changing in the mind-set of the public administration. For the first time, the idea that 314 also who is at the bottom of the organization can improve or change things was felt as an 315 opportunity by many. 316
Discussion 317
Through application of the framework of sensemaking (Weick et al., 2005; Weick, 1979 ) to a case 318 study of bottom-up innovation in a public organization, this paper presents the managerial and 319 technological issues to consider when it comes to build a smart community of innovators inside 320 local governments. The study is based on a single case study, using interviews, documental analysis 321 and participant observations, in order to gather rich and longitudinal data. The results point out that 322 during the enactment of the surrounding environment, the phase in which individuals become aware 323 15 of the problem, it is hard to find the person in charge of pushing the project forward through the 324 bureaucratic steps of the public administration process (Jappinen, 2015; Mulgan, 2007a) . Even if 325 directors seemed to share the vision, they felt the task was out of their perimeter and the proposal 326 remained stuck for as long as one year. The executives' and political consensus was shaken by the 327 endorsement of an innovation champion, member of the city council, that enabled the transition 328 from idea to practice, unlocking the bureaucratic interruption and political opposition. Moreover, 329 the involvement of the external community of experts enabled the internal community's credibility 330 and transparency and made it more difficult to abandon the idea. 331
In the selection phase, when people advance their possible interpretations and solutions to the 332 problem, the bureaucratic environment largely discouraged employees from responding to the call 333 for proposals, who preferred to stay in their anonymity and everyday duties (Jappinen, 2015 ; 334 activities of community building and awareness rising. Indeed, the participation was below 337 expectations and also the interactions between departments quietly rare. The promoters seemed to 338 have forgotten that Innova.TO was born during a conversation about the relationship between 339 human capital and innovation, ending up with an online platform to which they delegated the 340 management of the entire initiative. Interestingly, the exclusion of some categories of employees 341 from the community had a double effect: while, on the one hand, it enabled bottom-up participation, 342 on the other it increased the antagonism of the excluded people, with significant delay during the 343 innovation's development. 344
In the redemption phase, when the outcomes are evaluated to interpreter what happened, the case 345 study revealed that Innova.TO was evaluated as a good tool to collect ideas, but nobody was put in 346 charge of managing the implementation of the winning projects and to stimulate the interactions 347 among the innovators Mendes et al., 2012; Mulgan, 2007a) . As somebody said, 348
